George Bush’S Great America [EN]: Chapter 332

<331>

“Why has the Iranian army suddenly been pushed into a defensive position?”

Bush couldn’t hide his doubts about the completely unexpected situation. He flipped through the reports, racking his brains to understand.

The reports detailed the following:

The Iranian army had seemed unstoppable, consistently winning battles until just a few days prior. While these were only local victories, a victory is still a victory, right?

The problem was the scale of these victories. They were pushing back the enemy, but only incrementally, reminiscent of the trench warfare of World War I. This was largely due to the Kurds’ relentless human wave tactics.

If one fell, two would take their place; if two fell, four would rise up.

Ironically, the Iranian army, despite repeated victories, saw their morale gradually decline simply because the enemy’s numbers seemed inexhaustible.

In most wars, such a situation wouldn’t cause morale to break. A temporary dip, perhaps, but not a complete collapse. Continuous victories should have bolstered their spirits.

However, the Iranian army was different. There’s a limit to everything. As the saying goes, ‘too much is as bad as too little.’ Even something good can become harmful in excess, and this was such a case.

The Iranian army poured out firepower day and night, yet the enemy showed no signs of diminishing. Absurd rumors even circulated, claiming some Kurds were immortal.

“Pouring it out day and night” was no exaggeration. They were genuinely engaged in combat around the clock, without a minute’s rest. While they eliminated many Kurdish rebels, a similar number of Iranian soldiers perished, creating a significant problem for Iran.

The more reservists they conscripted, the fewer young people remained to sustain the economy, which was already strained by the wartime footing. The economy became increasingly devastated.

In a total war between countries, they could have sought reparations. However, this was a rebellion – or, as the Kurds would argue, a war of independence. But for Iran, the Kurds were merely rebels, and this conflict was a civil war.

This was because the Kurds were only causing trouble within Iran, not attacking other countries.

The Iranian government avoided external friction, citing the presence of a company-level of US troops temporarily stationed in each country, not even a division. Furthermore, it was an open secret that the Kurds’ equipment was a mix of European and American products.

However, the Iranian government’s frustration changed nothing. To reclaim Iran’s sovereignty and territory, they had to continue the seemingly futile fight with the Kurds, and the longer it continued, the greater the damage became.

The damage felt by Iranians was so severe that some even suggested recognizing Kurdish independence and planning for the future.

Soldiers were fortunate if they were shot and returned home with their bodies intact. In many cases, they were hit by artillery shells, leaving behind only fragments of flesh, making identification impossible.

Although suppressed due to the nature of the regime and culture, anti-war sentiment was widespread among the populace, fueled by the constant battlefield conditions.

These factors gradually accumulated, creating a critical vulnerability.

“In other words, the Kurdish rebels have been launching offensives at a consistent level. This has led to fixed front lines.”

“That’s the cause of the misjudgment. They had been launching the same war of attrition offensives for months, and then suddenly changed their strategy, so it’s understandable that they took a big hit. But the Iranian army is still strong, and even if they were pushed into a defensive position, it shouldn’t have been a fatal blow.”

The Kurdish rebels’ deployment was roughly as follows:

They committed the large-scale armored forces and limited air force personnel they had been conserving to the fixed front lines. Acquiring an air force was no easy feat. Training pilots and obtaining fighter jets was incredibly difficult.

If they hadn’t sold off their old Eurofighters through African channels to replace them with proper fighter jets, the Kurdish rebels would have had no air force. And they would have been even less able to operate them without Western European assistance.

In any case, when the small number of air force personnel that they had been saving up were committed, the Iranian army realized that the Kurds’ intentions extended beyond consistent, reckless human wave tactics or a simple breakthrough; they had a ‘different purpose’.

However, blocking this offensive wasn’t insurmountable. Dealing with the large-scale armored forces was challenging, but the Iranian army had always maintained air superiority. A few outdated fighter jets wouldn’t change that.

Despite the surprise attack, the Iranian army responded calmly and minimized the damage. This was a testament to the military administration, which maintained operational capabilities even while deploying veteran soldiers and raw recruits to the front lines, and to the on-site command, which reacted swiftly.

The problem was that their focus on the front lines left them blind to the ‘other purpose’ and the relatively safe rear.

It wasn’t that the rear was entirely devoid of enemies, but the Kurdish presence there was limited to company-sized units. Furthermore, these weren’t external forces, but guerrillas organized from within, occasionally discovered and eliminated.

This situation stemmed from the misjudgment of troop concentration. They assumed all enemy forces were committed to the front lines, but a division-sized unit suddenly appeared in the rear.

The question was how they bypassed the front lines. The answer was simple: through Afghanistan, Iran’s soft underbelly.

Ever since the United States transformed Afghanistan from a backward country into a sharp dagger aimed at China and Iran, Iran had been wary of Afghanistan. After East Iraq became a semi-pro-Iranian state, Iranian troops were primarily stationed in the east.

They believed Pakistan would contain Afghanistan in the event of war, but they couldn’t ignore India’s influence behind Pakistan. Therefore, the Iranian army had to directly deter the Afghan army.

However, the Kurdish uprising in the west came as a complete surprise, forcing them to redeploy troops from various locations to confront the new threat.

Since the Kurdish rebels adopted a war of attrition, the Iranian army faced a difficult situation. Unless there was a significant technological disparity, quantity could only be countered by quantity. The Iranian army had to withdraw forces from the east, including those guarding Afghanistan, and deploy them to the western front.

As the eastern army withdrew, the border with Afghanistan became sparsely defended.

It was a vast border, and despite technological advancements, physical surveillance remained essential.

As manpower shifted west, the dense outposts became fewer and farther between. Even with sufficient personnel, they would have been forced to work 12-hour shifts or even reside at the outposts, but the situation was so dire that they had to reduce the number of outposts.

Neglecting border surveillance, regardless of the dangers at the front, seemed reckless. But even if they were reckless, why would the Afghan army invade?

The Iranian government’s assessment was as follows:

The Afghan army was the United States’ hunting dog. If an invasion was planned, it would have been conducted with the US military. However, the US was preoccupied with China.

The presence of three carrier strike groups in the Arabian Sea suggested significant attention to the Middle East, but even the mighty US military couldn’t attack Iran without justification. While justifications existed, they were weak.

The most plausible justification was maintaining peace, but this would necessitate attacking the Kurdish rebels, a losing proposition.

Therefore, under this assessment, the majority of troops stationed on the Afghan border were diverted to the western front.

‘That’s not entirely wrong,’ Bush chuckled.

In fact, Bush had no intention of invading the Middle East. He personally avoided it, aware of the consequences of US intervention. Furthermore, Europe held greater influence in the region than the United States.

Above all, the existence of Afghanistan as a valuable asset and the shift of oil companies’ focus to the domestic shale industry were significant factors.

The United States’ current interest in the Middle East was as a ‘land of war’ where blood flowed daily. There was no desire for conquest or to spread democracy with a sense of chosen destiny.

China, with its Communist Party leadership and uncensored media coverage of daily life and conflicts, had largely monopolized that narrative. The media, free from restrictions on sensationalism, actively sought out and amplified such elements.

“It’s time to move out of the room.”