George Bush’s Great America – Episode 332
America handed Qingdao over to the Communist Party, the only legitimate government they recognized in China.
This news spread like wildfire across China and then throughout the world. The Chinese Civil War, arguably the largest war of the 21st century, became a focal point of global interest.
Li Kechang knew that the current state of war wouldn’t last long, even with the ongoing conflicts between warlords. While he could forcefully advance, continuous setbacks would inevitably lead to constant retreats.
It was a frustrating situation: fighting a capable enemy while possessing a strategically advantageous forward base with near-indestructible capabilities. He could mitigate the issues once or twice, but repeated occurrences would eventually cause significant damage.
No one wanted to be constantly threatened.
Most importantly, it severely limited the front line and potential offensive strategies.
If only they could completely control the Bohai Sea or the West Korea Bay. Or at least the Yellow Sea. But that was a distant dream. The Yellow Sea was a region where not only China but also a recently prominent Korea were actively vying for influence.
He wasn’t afraid of Korea alone, which had a relatively weak navy, but their cooperation with the Communist Party was a nuisance.
So far, Korea’s involvement was limited to troop deployments, but a direct armed conflict at sea would give them an excuse to intervene and pursue their own interests. This wouldn’t be a problem in peacetime, but Korea was currently facing a severe capital shortage.
Of course, now that Qingdao had returned to the Communist Party, the US military was expected to withdraw, but they remained under the guise of providing humanitarian security. Li Kechang’s situation would have been far more precarious had he not received assurances that they would leave Qingdao as soon as an armistice was declared.
And Li Kechang, who had achieved this, felt a conflicting urge to strangle himself.
Having to rely on someone who was essentially an enemy, even for a noble cause, was infuriating and distasteful. Li Kechang felt a deep sense of anger and frustration, as if the word ‘humiliation’ had been specifically created for this situation.
But the reality remained unchanged. Li Kechang maintained his composed and determined demeanor, with no guarantee that his self-discipline would yield positive results. He could sabotage the United States if he chose to, but not at this moment.
The suffering populace, the impoverished nation, and the depleted national treasury helped Li Kechang temper his anger and regain his composure. The position of chairman carried immense responsibility, overshadowing personal feelings.
If Li Kechang had assumed power during peacetime, things would have been different. It was common for leaders to act on their emotions, as long as their actions didn’t cross certain boundaries.
However, the current circumstances denied Li Kechang even that luxury. If he governed according to his whims, China risked disappearing from history.
Even if the sense of Chinese identity persisted, preventing the complete disappearance of Chinese culture, he understood that they might never reclaim their former glory as the center of the world, the Zhonghua [Middle Kingdom].
But it wasn’t too late. If they reunified now, united, eliminated the warlords, completely reorganized, and then revived the economy, they could achieve even greater prosperity than before. The separation of Tibet and Uyghur might even be beneficial.
The budget allocated to suppressing and assimilating these two autonomous regions was substantial. Li Kechang personally viewed them as a white elephant [a costly possession with no practical use]. This sentiment stemmed partly from his moral convictions, but also from the current reality.
When China was thriving, these regions weren’t a burden. More people meant more tax revenue, which in turn strengthened the national treasury. This was especially true when the government didn’t have to worry about extensive welfare programs.
The problem arose when control became unsustainable. If the cost of maintaining control exceeded the tax revenue and natural resources extracted from the land, it became a financial drain.
Even if they hadn’t declared independence, reclaiming them and establishing stability would have been an arduous task. The Communist Party would have had to compromise, leading to increased rights and autonomy for these regions.
And the likely outcome would have been eventual independence.
Moreover, there were internal threats. With the Bo Xilai affair adding to the pressure, Li Kechang felt overwhelmed, yet he resolutely led the Communist Party and China, convinced that he was on the best possible path.
Regarding the Bo Xilai affair, Bo Xilai, realizing his downfall, confessed everything he knew. While Li Kechang wasn’t privy to all the details, he had always harbored reservations about Bo Xilai and used the opportunity to remove him from power.
He suspected that the opposition was plotting a rebellion, so it was fortunate that he caught Bo Xilai.
“Are you certain that Xi Jinping isn’t involved in this?”
“Yes? Yes, that’s right.”
Li Kechang was incredulous at Bo Xilai’s response, as he believed that Xi Jinping, above all others, must be involved. His concern stemmed from Xi Jinping’s position as a leader of the opposition and a potential contender for the chairmanship.
He wouldn’t be concerned about an incompetent individual with mere backing, but in Li Kechang’s eyes, Xi Jinping seemed capable of delivering a fatal blow at any moment. This assessment wasn’t far from the truth, as Xi Jinping was secretly building power to challenge Li Kechang.
‘It was an opportunity to purge the entire opposition, but it’s a shame.’
Even if it was a purge, it wasn’t a major issue. It would involve either dismissing them from their positions or sending them to the front lines. After addressing these questions and doubts, only one question remained.
‘Who is the mastermind?’
Li Kechang initially believed that Xi Jinping was the mastermind. But if Xi Jinping wasn’t the mastermind, what did that imply? It was truly frustrating.
‘If you have a question, you should find the answer.’
So, he questioned Bo Xilai, using the persuasive power of military strength, and received a chilling response.
“Wang Qishan!”
Wang Qishan held the position of Beijing Mayor, and more importantly, he was Xi Jinping’s closest confidant.
The Mayor of Beijing held one of the most crucial positions in China, in constant contact with the central power, and essentially part of the central power itself.
‘But even Wang Qishan couldn’t have gathered this much support.’
Li Kechang was convinced as he examined the extensive list of names in his hand. He concluded that Xi Jinping must have used Wang Qishan as his proxy. He had sensed Xi Jinping’s growing power, but he was surprised to have obtained concrete evidence in this manner.
It was natural to prepare contingency plans while plotting a rebellion, but this seemed excessive. While the participants implicitly knew that Xi Jinping was behind Wang Qishan, Wang Qishan was likely the only one who knew the full extent of Xi Jinping’s involvement.
Realizing this, Li Kechang felt a sense of disgust.
‘There’s a limit to how meticulous a person can be. This is too much. What should I do?’
He could launch a massive crackdown based on the list of names and pressure Xi Jinping by highlighting Wang Qishan’s close ties, but that was all he could do.
Li Kechang wanted to eliminate them all, but the Communist Party desperately needed talented individuals, preventing a complete purge.
Such a purge would cripple the Communist Party. He had received assurances from the United States that they would hand over Qingdao to the Communist Party starting tomorrow, and the military situation was improving, signaling a potential victory in the war, but internal politics remained turbulent.
If he selectively removed some individuals, Xi Jinping would be temporarily hampered, but Li Kechang still viewed Xi Jinping as a potential threat who could interfere and seize the chairmanship, even after China’s reunification.
And Li Kechang’s concerns were not unfounded.
“I knew that the chairman was causing trouble, but everything was ruined by one idiot.”
Tsk.
Xi Jinping clicked his tongue. Losing his right-hand man and confidant, Wang Qishan, was a truly tragic and painful event.
Right-hand man was no exaggeration. Xi Jinping felt as if his right arm had been severed. But soon, the pain turned into relief, and relief transformed into ambition.
‘If I had prepared better, I would be in that position now.’
Age was a barrier to waiting for Li Kechang to step down peacefully. He was already past his prime, and according to the “7 up, 8 down” rule [an unofficial age-based retirement policy in Chinese politics], he would have to relinquish his position at a certain age. Such customs were irrelevant with sufficient power, but Xi Jinping lacked that power.
He had seized power with the support of former chairmen who were now deceased or missing, but that was the extent of his advantage. If the circumstances had been the same, Xi Jinping would have been closer to the chairmanship than the mild-mannered Li Kechang, but Li Kechang had suddenly adopted a more assertive approach, reminiscent of Xiang Yu [a prominent military leader in ancient China].
It wasn’t that he displayed the same ruthlessness as Xiang Yu, but Li Kechang’s spirit was similar. In particular, he shifted from policies focused on people’s livelihoods to aggressive policies aimed at reviving China by ‘any means necessary,’ mirroring Xiang Yu’s approach.
As a result, Li Kechang was now the chairman.
‘There’s no reason why that can’t be me.’
Xi Jinping was generally a quiet individual, possessing a captivating charisma that inspired awe through fear and pressure, unlike Li Kechang’s more approachable demeanor.
‘But I must refrain from acting for the time being.’
A minor power struggle had erupted within the Communist Party.