The Chaebol Returns To The Presidency 1967 [EN]: Chapter 159

159. Where Did Xenon Come From?

At one point, he dipped his hand into the water, creating rhythmic sounds by striking a submerged object.

Splash! Splash!

Suddenly, the water in front of the rubber tube swirled.

A periscope, like a polished steel pipe, rose swiftly.

Soon, a sleek, black form, resembling a dolphin, surfaced. It was a small infiltration submarine.

Clunk-

The submarine’s hatch creaked open.

A crew member emerged and tossed a lifeline to the man.

The man grabbed the rope, hauled himself aboard, and disappeared inside the hatch.

The man was a special operative from the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS).

*

Ministry of National Defense.

The President, the Minister of National Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. White House National Security Advisor, and the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) were gathered for a closed-door National Security Council (NSC) meeting.

The Director of the NIS delivered his report.

“The Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) analyzed the samples retrieved by the operative and discovered high concentrations of xenon in the air and soil.”

A heavy silence descended upon the room.

Radioactive xenon isotopes are byproducts of nuclear fission in uranium-235 (U-235) and plutonium-239 (Pu-239), the key ingredients for atomic bombs.

Since xenon is virtually nonexistent in its natural state, the detection of these isotopes provided compelling evidence of a nuclear test.

The Commander of USFK sighed audibly.

“Oh my God…”

Small-scale underground explosions, registering around magnitude 2 on the Richter scale, had been repeatedly observed in North Korea. Intelligence agencies suspected these were nuclear tests but lacked concrete evidence.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), based in Vienna, Austria, monitors nuclear tests globally but primarily focuses on underground tests with a yield of 1 kiloton (kt) or greater.

A 1 kt explosion should generate seismic vibrations equivalent to a magnitude 4 earthquake.

However, since the observed events were consistently around magnitude 2, they were dismissed from further scrutiny.

The South Korean President, drawing on his knowledge from the future, knew North Korea’s history of nuclear ambitions. He remained vigilant, deploying all available intelligence assets from both Korea and the United States to ascertain whether the North was indeed conducting nuclear tests.

However, no xenon was detected in air samples collected near the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

Xenon has a short half-life and disperses rapidly into the atmosphere, necessitating detection within ten days of a nuclear event.

U.S. spy satellites monitored suspected areas, but gathering conclusive data on underground explosions proved challenging.

Intelligence analysts from the United States and other nations speculated that North Korea was deliberately detonating several kilotons of conventional explosives underground, feigning nuclear development to gain leverage in international negotiations.

They downplayed the suspicions, arguing, “How could a small, impoverished country of fewer than 20 million people, dependent on South Korean aid for survival, possibly develop nuclear weapons?”

Undeterred, the South Korean President ordered the direct collection of samples from the vicinity of Punggye-ri, the suspected site of the underground explosions, to obtain more definitive proof.

The President, already informed about the xenon detection, remained composed.

During Chairman Wang’s era, North Korea had openly conducted its first nuclear test in 2006.

But this time, the North was attempting to develop nuclear weapons more than 30 years ahead of schedule.

The Director of the NIS continued his briefing.

“Based on the earthquake’s magnitude, we believe it was a small-scale nuclear test.”

The U.S. National Security Advisor, caught off guard, inquired.

“Where did they obtain the plutonium, the raw material for nuclear bombs?”

“Since North Korea lacks a nuclear reactor, we presume they imported a small quantity from abroad through clandestine channels. Our assessment is that they are in the experimental phase and lack the capacity to manufacture nuclear warheads.”

“If they imported it, do you suspect a particular country is aiding North Korea’s nuclear ambitions?”

“Currently, they cannot produce plutonium domestically, leaving them no alternative but to import it.”

The Minister of National Defense interjected.

“Now that North Korea’s small-scale nuclear test has been confirmed, how should we respond?”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared.

“This is tantamount to a declaration of war against us. We must halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through the UN Security Council. If they refuse, we must consider it an act of war.”

The Commander of USFK added.

“We must exert pressure on North Korea through robust military actions, short of actual force. If they remain unresponsive, we may have to resort to force.”

“Force is a last resort. We must cut off all aid to North Korea, including oil and the Kaesong Industrial Complex [a joint economic zone between North and South Korea]. Economic sanctions will force them to yield.”

The attendees, taken by surprise, overwhelmingly favored a hard-line approach.

But the President knew that these measures were merely theoretical.

The President spoke.

“What if North Korea denies conducting a nuclear test, or claims it was merely a small-scale research experiment?”

“……”

“What if they insist, ‘We don’t have a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium, the raw material for nuclear weapons, so what nuclear weapons are you talking about!’?”

“……”

If the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, exercised its veto power, decisive international action would be impossible.

The Four-Party Talks and Six-Party Talks were simply delaying tactics.

They broadcast the demolition of the nuclear reactor cooling tower to the world as a charade, but ultimately, they developed nuclear weapons using the plutonium extracted from the dollars and supplies they received as aid.

North Korea, having resolved to develop nuclear weapons, would not abandon its pursuit, even if half its population starved to death due to economic sanctions.

Having witnessed North Korea’s nuclear weapons acquisition process firsthand, the President’s response was different.

“North Korea is not a member of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and is a closed country, making it impossible to verify and dismantle their nuclear program. They will continue to develop nuclear weapons to the end, even if half their people starve. My primary concern is the reason they conducted nuclear tests despite lacking a nuclear reactor.”

During Chairman Wang’s time, North Korea’s nuclear test was made possible by plutonium from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.

However, it was suspicious that they had conducted several nuclear tests without a nuclear reactor yet.

North Korea had previously declared itself a nuclear power through a large-scale surprise nuclear test after securing a sufficient amount of plutonium in preparation for being caught in a nuclear test.

However, he judged that there was something fishy about the reason for risking exposure to nuclear tests without raw materials.

The President said.

“Suppose, just suppose, that a country aiding North Korea has already transported nuclear warheads into North Korea for strategic purposes.”

The room buzzed with murmurs.

The U.S. National Security Advisor asked.

“Are you suggesting that the Soviet Union or China secretly deployed nuclear weapons in North Korea?”

“That’s my inference. It could be a strategy to disguise the covert deployment of nuclear weapons as North Korea’s indigenous nuclear development. If we announce the evidence of this nuclear test, they will immediately conduct a nuclear test and declare themselves a nuclear power.”

The attendees were stunned.

The President’s words were a bombshell.

The U.S. National Security Advisor, a strategic weapons expert, said.

“It’s a plausible scenario, but it seems like a premature conclusion. First, we need to confirm whether they are in the experimental stage or whether they have imported the weapons.”

“The scenario is definitely a possibility. The key to my proposal is to avoid prematurely disclosing the xenon detection without a concrete solution. We might fall into their trap.”

“As you said, Mr. President, we should refrain from announcing it and keep it confidential until the information is verified.”

The intelligence networks of the democratic nations around the world were mobilized.

The CIA, MI6 [British Secret Intelligence Service], and even Mossad [Israeli Intelligence Agency] began searching for traces of nuclear warhead movement.

South Korea gathered information through every available means, including human intelligence operating within North Korea.

*

Some time later, the results came in.

The Director of the NIS reported to the President.

“Your prediction was correct, Mr. President. The U.S. CIA has discovered evidence of nuclear warhead movement.”

“Hmm, I knew it… Where did they bring them from?”

“From the Soviet Union.”

“Hmm, as expected.”

“The information indicates that approximately 10 medium- and short-range missiles, disguised as food supplies, entered North Korea by train six months ago.”

“Ten missiles!”

If they were in the midst of a nuclear development experiment, there would be ample opportunity to intervene, but if they had already imported the weapons and were staging a show, the chance to stop them had been lost.

“How does the United States interpret North Korea’s motives for importing them?”

“They believe the Soviet Union’s demands were stronger than North Korea’s.”

“The Soviet Union? Why?”

“As China leaned towards the West and North Korea pursued Chinese-style economic reforms, the Soviet Union, fearing isolation, provided North Korea with resources and food and deployed nuclear weapons to maintain its influence.”

“Hmm….”

“North Korea, reluctant to accept aid from South Korea due to national pride, calculated that possessing nuclear weapons would reverse the situation and accepted the offer.”

“Damn it! The North Korean bastards always stab you in the back when you help them!”

During Chairman Wang’s time, South Korea’s aid to North Korea was diverted to nuclear weapons development, and history was repeating itself.

The Director of the NIS said.

“If they already possess nuclear warheads, our negotiating leverage may be limited. If our allied forces conduct a military demonstration, they might use it as a pretext to retaliate.”

“That’s what I feared. They’re aiming for that and employing calculated tactics. They’re pretending to be in the nuclear test phase to appear as if they are developing the weapons themselves, and they’re simply seeking an excuse to emerge as a nuclear power if things go awry.”

“I don’t know what to do, Mr. President!”

“Let’s pretend we don’t know for now. And let’s find a solution. Let’s develop a plan before deciding whether to respond publicly.”

“I understand, Mr. President. I will convene the National Security Council.”

“Don’t do it.”

“Yes?”

“There will be North Korean spies within our government. If you keep convening the NSC, they will become suspicious. Since we are remaining silent for now, inform only the Minister of National Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff separately and maintain secrecy.”

“I understand.”

The President sank into deep thought.

He called President Jung and briefed him on the situation.

After listening intently, President Jung suggested.

“Mr. President, South Korea is also only one nuclear test away from completion. If North Korea declares nuclear weapons possession, how about South Korea making a counter-declaration, so that both North and South Korea are recognized as nuclear powers simultaneously?”

He was trying to resolve the regret of not being recognized for possession at the stage of completing nuclear weapons in his previous life.

The President said.

“That could be an option. But it’s a last resort.”

“……”

“If we recognize North Korea’s nuclear possession, our nuclear possession will be less meaningful. And it will trigger a domino effect of nuclear weapons proliferation in Northeast Asia. Japan is also diligently stockpiling plutonium, and they will seize this opportunity to revise their nuclear armament policy and pacifist constitution. We need to find a better solution.”

“Ah, I see your point. It’s a truly complex equation to solve.”

*

The Director of the NIS presented the Rodong Sinmun [North Korea’s official newspaper].

The front page featured a massive headline:

– Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Successfully Launches Medium-Range Ballistic Rocket!

The accompanying photo showed a missile launch with Chairman Kim observing.

The President frowned.

“He’s flaunting his nuclear warhead delivery capability.”

“Analysis reveals it’s not an indigenously developed missile but a Soviet medium-range missile that has been repainted with the North Korean flag.”

“He’s taking steps to declare himself a nuclear warhead missile-possessing country!”