The Great America of George Bush – 353
Africa was being suppressed by the United States’ power, like a heavy lid on a boiling pot. If the steam can’t escape, an explosion is inevitable.
But this lid weighed 100 tons and was welded shut. In that case, the pot would burst long before the lid could ever be blown off. And that’s precisely what was happening. Discontent was rampant across Africa, but the United States was suppressing it with immense force through its military and the CIA. So, while everything appeared calm on the surface, the pressure inside was steadily rising.
Shouldn’t some of that steam be released? And if so, where? The obvious candidates were Sudan and South Sudan.
With the CIA’s active involvement, Western Sudan half-heartedly withdrew from the battle for Abyei [a contested region rich in oil]. Sudan and South Sudan were now positioned to more easily turn their guns on each other. The problem was that most of the surrounding countries, which should have been sharing their fate, had been manipulated into withdrawing, thanks to the CIA’s machinations.
This was more critical for Sudan than for the newly formed nation of South Sudan. Sudan was convinced that the United States was deliberately trying to starve it out, and in reality, they weren’t far from the truth.
It wasn’t so much about starvation as it was about balancing the power dynamics, cutting off support and supplies to reduce the scale of the conflict. However, one thing they somewhat overlooked was that humans don’t simply stop fighting because conditions are harsh.
Thus, the small war over the ownership of Abyei, originally just an oil-rich area, escalated into a major war with national stakes. The reason a war to seize a single region became a matter of national survival was that all available resources were being poured into it.
Western Sudan had already been generously compensated by the CIA for the debts it incurred by recklessly expanding its military beyond its means, and had left the game early. But for the rest, who weren’t invited to the party orchestrated by the United States, there was no turning back. Their only remaining option was to defeat their opponent and pay off their debts with the spoils of war.
As the saying goes, winning is everything, right? That’s right, all you have to do is win. All the current instability and visible cracks can be resolved by winning. Occupying Abyei, the city of desire and longing, and extracting reparations from the opponent would truly solve everything.
The inevitable weakening of the adversary due to reparations, economic revitalization through oil drilling, a national strategy that would determine the next half-century, international standing based on victory or defeat, even resolving internal conflicts and problems—the woes of a poor nation—the victor’s right to write history, and in the case of Sudan, perhaps even the unification of a homeland divided by the Americans.
As the short-term conflict turned into a long-term war of attrition, with everyone waiting to see who would strike first due to American intervention, there was no way the surrounding countries wouldn’t pay attention. Of course, the CIA had directed support and resources from neighboring countries to Western Sudan or prevented aid from reaching South Sudan or Sudan, but were they merely puppets of the United States? They were forced to comply by the iron fist of oppression and the dangling carrot of aid.
However, they were told not to provide support openly, not to officially wage war. It was a sophistry, but diplomacy is often like that. Moreover, it wasn’t formal diplomacy but pressure exerted through the CIA, wasn’t it?
That’s precisely why. Starting with Somalia, and including Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Libya, and others—if they bordered the three Sudans or could exert a certain level of influence, they began to test the waters.
Among these, Egypt and Libya were definitely not deeply involved. They were too preoccupied with their own internal affairs. If they had any spare capacity to support someone or join a war, they had to direct it all domestically. Civil wars were no easy matter.
Especially in the case of Libya, the government was on the verge of collapsing and being replaced. It was a country showing all the signs of civil war from the start. In the midst of this, ethnic minorities formed rebel groups, essentially civilian armies. It was fortunate that they formed, but they weren’t unified.
As many as seven self-proclaimed ‘legitimate civilian armies’ were fighting each other. This gave the Libyan government a breather. If they had united and risen up, it wouldn’t have been easy for the government forces to suppress them. However, instead of fighting together, they engaged in infighting over resources, choosing political compromises rather than optimal strategies or operations, which was a great boon for the government forces.
This was particularly evident in the defense of Benghazi. It was a ‘normal urban warfare,’ rarely seen in China, which had carried out operations completely disregarding the safety of civilians in the past. It was a war of occupation, not with overwhelming firepower, but by methodically occupying streets and alleys with various fire support and infantry.
The government forces simply held firm, and the civilian armies eventually retreated due to a lack of coordination. That was all it took, but it was enough for the government forces, which were outnumbered, to launch a counterattack, and eventually, the civilian armies were driven inland.
So, what about the other countries where the internal situation was relatively stable?
Most of them were under the influence of the United States. Needless to say, this was due to American ‘aid,’ but also due to military pressure. The incident where they massively deployed their air force because of a few Americans, regardless of cost-benefit analysis, was something that everyone in the world, not just in Africa, remembered.
It was diplomatic discourtesy itself, but no country could openly protest against the United States. At least, that was the kind of country the United States was now. A transcendent nation that played above the laws they had set themselves. That’s what a hyper-dominant power is like.
Anyway, apart from kowtowing, they were calculating their own gains and losses. How could they influence this war in a way that would benefit their own country?
For a normal country, not in Africa, the top priority would be to prevent the war from spreading to their own country. If even that was impossible, they would participate in the war but ensure victory with minimal losses.
But Africa is different. Civil wars break out frequently, and even administrative districts are often not properly managed, and in severe cases, warlords take over. In this situation, trying to avoid war like Sim Cheong [a Korean folktale character known for extreme filial piety and self-sacrifice] is nearly impossible.
Thanks to American aid, they are somehow subjugating the warlords and sending proper officials to administrative districts that are virtually autonomous, so they are relatively stable now, but if the aid is cut off within 10 years at the latest, they will revert to the past. Wouldn’t it be good to have one or two insurance policies to strengthen central control?
“It’s war!”
Thus, a great war broke out. An African war involving most of the countries bordering the three Sudans, which have terribly large borders, erupted.
Although only Sudan and South Sudan were actually fighting, it was common for unidentified armies to join as volunteers.
“I thought Africa would be a mess from the start, but this is severe.”
The Chief of Staff nodded at Bush’s words.
“It’s still better now.”
Indeed, it was. What is never missing in today’s Africa-related documentaries is the United States’ efforts to somehow bring Africa back to normal. Whether it’s nature, current affairs, human interest, culture, or even the environment or history, if it’s a documentary, the United States must be included.
For example, in the case of nature, humans are naturally excluded except for indigenous people, but through narration, ‘Rare animals are being protected through the efforts of the local government and the U.S. government,’ or in terms of history, ‘Conflict zones with World Heritage sites have regained peace due to U.S. pressure,’ are always mentioned.
That’s because most of the countries or broadcasters that make documentaries are connected to American capital, so it’s natural, but that doesn’t mean that American efforts are lies or exaggerations.
They poured a lot of wealth into trying to bring it back to normal. It goes without saying that the countries receiving aid became more compliant as the money flowed in.
“The important thing is that if we leave this as it is, our efforts will turn into bubbles.”
“What are you going to do?”
“Didn’t you say the war hasn’t officially started yet?”
“As you know, the declarations of war are over. According to local agents, the war will definitely break out in about 3 days…”
“Indeed.”
Unless it’s a situation like the Middle East, where civil wars are constantly repeated, there’s no need to overthink this kind of situation. Aren’t these people even diligently receiving aid?
Then the response is also very simple and straightforward.
“Then we just have to shut them all up.”
“Yes?”
“Why are you questioning me? Intimidate and threaten them. Tell them to stop fighting each other unless they all want to die.”
The measures Bush put forward were so simple that they even seemed childish. It was like an elementary school teacher simply mediating children’s fights. Ignoring the cause or process, just repeating the principle that ‘violence is bad!’ like an ignorant elementary school teacher.
“Will that work?”
The problem is that there is such a power imbalance between the United States and the small African countries. They had the absolute power to fight and win against the entire Africa without much difficulty. If the United States lost the war, it would be one of two things: an unprecedented natural disaster covering the entire humanity, such as the Yellowstone eruption, or a large-scale anti-war protest in the United States like in the Vietnam era.
And in the former case, as far as Bush knew, there was no such situation, and in the latter case, unless it really lasted for more than 5 years, there was virtually no possibility. It was thanks to the authority that Bush had built so diligently and madly. What Bush had built was different from the achievements of other presidents.
To be precise, there was an ‘excuse’ for that authority. The United States had been attacked by terrorists in the past, and Africa and the Middle East were the hotbeds of terrorism. And Americans, unless they were truly hardcore anti-war activists, were full of people who loathed terrorists. So, anti-war sentiment had no choice but to subside.
Besides, there was also a guarantee that if it was just a war, not an occupation, it would all be over within a month in the 21st century.
Anyway, all Bush had to say to them was just one thing.
“Tell them to be quiet unless they all want to end up like East Iraq.”